Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

From Leftypedia
(Redirected from USSR)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Сою́з Сове́тских Социалисти́ческих Респу́блик
The Soviet Union

Map of the USSR
Flag of the Soviet Union Emblem of the Soviet Union
Flag State Emblem

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (acronym: USSR; or in Russian: СССР), and also known as the Soviet Union (SU), was a Marxist-Leninist state on the Eurasian continent that existed between 1922 and 1991. It was governed as a single-party state by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with Moscow as its capital.


Russian Revolution[edit]

The RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) emerged out of the Russian revolution of 1917, with Bolshevik revolutionary Vladimir Lenin as its first president. The new government created a constitution establishing itself as a Socialist republic.

Red vs. White Civil War[edit]

In 1918, following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, a civil war between the Bolsheviks (or ‘Reds’) and the remaining monarchists (the ‘Whites’), along with various disgruntled social democrats and liberals such as their rival faction, the Mensheviks, tore apart the RSFSR. Despite support from the capitalist Western Powers, the Whites were ultimately defeated in 1920.

During the war, the Bolsheviks militarily intervened in Ukraine, which was under the control of anarcho-communists (led by Nestor Makhno) and Ukrainian ultranationalists. The anarchists made a treaty with the Bolsheviks in 1920, but the Bolsheviks refused to publicly acknowledge it, leading to the arrest of Nestor Makhno and his delegation upon confronting the Bolsheviks.

New Economic Policy[edit]

The New Economic Policy was part of what historian Brinton called the thermidor after the French Revolution's Thermidorian Reaction. It involved a variety of concessions to the backward strata of Soviet society, including the restoration of obstacles to divorce, laws against homosexuality, and the abolition of the age of consent laws [1]. Economically, it meant that industrial state owner enterprises gained autonomy in its policies while in rural areas individual private initiative and enterprise was allowed to dominate economic conduct.

In 1928 the NEP ended when the Soviet government implemented the first Five Year Plan. This became known as central planning or a command economy, which lasted until circa 1991 when the economy had reached a critical point in the crisis of the absolute over-accumulation of capital.

Socialism in one country[edit]

In spite of the overpowered bureaucracy and some of the reactionary concessions, the Soviets made extensive achievements which vastly improved life for hundreds of millions of people. These achievements were the result of the planned economy (built primarily during the 1930s). Even reactionaries[2] have been unable to deny this;[3] as antisocialist propagandist Nick Eberstadt admitted:

Stalin’s results were incontestable. This is a point those of us in the West often overlook. Stalin inherited a country that was the primary casualty of World War I, and bequeathed to his successors a super-power. It is but a single measure of the success of the ‘Leader’, and his understanding of the endurance of his nation, that between 1940 and 1953, a period marked by an immensely destructive world war costing perhaps twenty million Soviet lives and a series of purges claiming perhaps not many less, the USSR doubled its production of coal and steel, tripled its output of cement and industrial goods, and increased its pool of skilled labor by a factor of ten. These rates of growth were geometrically higher than in the less devastated and Terror-free West.

The claim that the Soviets purged ‘perhaps not many less’ than twenty-million people, however, is obvious nonsense:

The Stalinist regime was consequently responsible for about a million purposeful killings, and through its criminal neglect and irresponsibility it was probably responsible for the premature deaths of about another two million more victims amongst the repressed population, i.e. in the camps, colonies, prisons, exile, in transit and in the POW camps for Germans. These are clearly much lower figures than those for whom Hitler’s regime was responsible.

The Stalin administration was thus responsible for about three million deaths, and even that is only if one includes Fascist POWs, victims of an unintentional but tragic famine (Wheatcroft’s own research proves that it was unintentional), and gulag prisoners. The purges of the late 1930s are a black mark on the USSR’s legacy; this much cannot be denied. That being said, they have been the subject of decades-worth of unjustified and intolerable distortions and exaggerations by bourgeois academics, necessitating a thorough reply. While Westerners are often treated to numbers ranging from 20 to 50 million, the true figures (while worrisome enough in their own right) are nowhere near that high. According to Professor J. Arch Getty:

From 1921 to […] 1953, around 800,000 people were sentenced to death and shot, 85 percent of them in the years of the Great Terror of 1937–1938. From 1934 to Stalin’s death, more than a million perished in the gulag camps.

To these figures must be added an important qualification: contrary to popular opinion, the vast majority of gulag inmates were not innocent political prisoners. Professor Getty notes that those convicted of ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ made up between 12 and 33 percent (depending on the year) of the gulag population, with the rest having been convicted of ordinary crimes. He also rejects the common claim that non-Russian nationalities were disproportionately targeted. To quote from his article in the American Historical Review, concerning the gulag inmates in particular:

The long-awaited archival evidence on repression in the period of the Great Purges shows that the levels of arrests, political prisoners, executions, and general camp populations tend to confirm the orders of magnitude indicated by those labeled as "revisionists" and mocked by those proposing high estimates. […] Inferences that the terror fell particularly hard on non-Russian nationalities are not borne out by camp population data from the 1930s. The frequent assertion that most of the camp prisoners were "political" also appears not to be true.

According to this research, alleged counterrevolutionaries never made up more than a third of the gulag population (and generally much less, around 12%). This is backed-up by a CIA report on the topic, which found that as many as 95% of camp prisoners were non-political in camps that they investigated.[4] The majority of camp prisoners were thus genuine criminals, convicted of rape, murder, theft, and similar. In addition, the gulag camps were not death camps like those of the Third Reich; they were prisons, albeit harsh ones. Even noted antisocialist scholars (such as those who worked on the infamous Black Book of Communism) have admitted this. To quote again from Professor Getty:

Stalin’s camps were different from Hitler’s. Tens of thousands of prisoners were released every year upon completion of their sentences. We now know that before World War II more inmates escaped annually from the Soviet camps than died there. […] Werth, a well-regarded French specialist on the Soviet Union whose sections in the Black Book on the Soviet Communists are sober and damning, told Le Monde, “Death camps did not exist in the Soviet Union.”

It must also be noted that, contrary to the popular conception of the USSR as a place of ‘total terror’ (to quote Hannah Arendt), the majority of the population did not feel threatened by the purges. Referring to the time of the Great Purge, Professor[5] Thurston notes that ‘my evidence suggests that widespread fear did not exist in the case at hand.’ He also notes that the Great Purge was an exceptional occurrence, which cannot be used to characterize the USSR pre-1953 as a whole:

I will not simply imply but will state outright that the Ezhovshchina (Great Purge) was an aberration. Torture was uncommon until August 1937, when it became the norm; it ended abruptly with Beria’s rise to head of the NKVD in late 1938. Mass arrests followed the same pattern. […] A campaign for more regular, fair, and systemic judicial procedures that began in 1933–1934 was interrupted and overwhelmed by the Terror in 1937. It resumed in the spring of 1938, more strongly and effectively than before. Thus more than one trend was broken by the Ezhovshchina, only to reappear after it.

He also points out that some arrests which took place during the Great Purge were based on previously ignored (yet arguably still legitimate) crimes against the Soviet state, such as fighting with the reactionary forces during the Civil War:

People were suddenly arrested in 1937 for things that had happened many years earlier but had been ignored since, for example, serving in a White army.

The question arises: why arrest former White Army soldiers, among others? The answer lies in the general fear of counterrevolution which pervaded the party at this time. According to Professor[6] James Harris:

By the mid–1930s, the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the militarists in Japan, both stridently anti-communist, posed a very real threat to the USSR. War was then on the horizon, and Stalin felt he had no choice but to take preemptive action against what he saw as a potential fifth column — a group that would undermine the larger collective.

—James Harris, [7]

Bear in mind that since the moment of its founding (still a recent event, at this time), Soviet Eurasia had been invaded by multiple capitalist powers[8] (including the United States) in the early 1920s, and had also been subject to espionage and internal sabotage. Combined with the looming threat of war with an increasingly powerful Third Reich, it is hardly surprising that these factors came together to form an atmosphere of paranoia, which lent itself to the sort of violent excess seen during the Purge. This coincides with Professor Thurston’s interpretation of the events, from his book Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia:

[…] between 1934 and 1936 police and court practice relaxed significantly. Then a series of events, together with the tense international situation and memories of real enemy activity during the savage Russian Civil War, combined to push leaders and people into a hysterical hunt for perceived ‘wreckers.’ After late 1938, however, the police and courts became dramatically milder.

This general atmosphere of fear (not of the purges, but of external and internal enemies) is most likely why the majority of the Soviet people seemed to support the government’s actions during the Purge period:

The various reactions to arrest cataloged above suggest that general fear did not exist in the USSR at any time in the late 1930s. […] People who remained at liberty often felt that some event in the backgrounds of the detained individuals justified their arrests. The sense that anyone could be next, the underpinning of theoretical systems of terror, rarely appears.

—Robert Thurston, [9]

In addition, modern evidence suggests that the masses did indeed support the Stalin administration, which likewise encouraged mass participation from the working people:

Stalin, the press, and the Stakhanovite movement all regularly encouraged ordinary people to criticize those in authority. […] If the citizenry was supposed to be terrorized and stop thinking, why encourage criticism and input from below on a large scale? […] my evidence suggests that widespread fear did not exist in the case at hand [the ‘Great Terror’ period].

These states were not entirely non-participatory as some have suggested; the working masses did have a genuine voice in political affairs. Professor Thurston states that ‘at the lower levels of society, in day-to-day affairs and the implementation of policy, [the Soviet system] was participatory.’ He notes that workers were frequently encouraged to take part in decision making:

The regime regularly urged its people to criticize local conditions and their leaders, at least below a certain exalted level. For example, in March 1937 Stalin emphasized the importance of the party’s ‘ties to the masses.’ To maintain them, it was necessary ‘to listen carefully to the voice of the masses, to the voice of rank and file members of the party, to the voice of so-called “little people,” to the voice of ordinary folk.’

—Robert Thurston, [10]

He makes the following observation:

Far from basing its rule on the negative means of coercion, the Soviet regime in the late 1930's fostered a limited but positive political role for the populace. […] Earlier concepts of the Soviet state require rethinking: the workers who ousted managers, achieved the imprisonment of their targets, and won reinstatement at factories did so through organizations which constituted part of the state apparatus and wielded state powers.

—Robert Thurston, [10]

These facts are all the more impressive when we recall the dismal state of workers’ rights in the market economies at this time:

This occurred at a time when American workers in particular were struggling for basic union recognition, which even when won did not provide much formal influence at the work place.

—Robert Thurston, [10]

Professor Thurston also states:

Stalin did not intend to terrorize the country and did not need to rule by fear. Memoirs and interviews with Soviet people indicate that many more believed in Stalin’s quest to eliminate internal enemies than were frightened by it.

Perhaps one of his most interesting statements (indeed, one of the most statements from any bourgeois historian dealing with the Stalin administration) and perhaps the most succinct summary of this issue is the following:

There was never a long period of Stalinism without a serious foreign threat, major internal dislocation, or both, which makes identifying its true nature impossible.

This relates to how the Soviet government reacted to the genuine material conditions faced by the Soviet Union, rather than simply following its own whims and desires. Working people did not only have the right to take part in decision-making at the workplace; they also had a voice in national policy decisions. Professor Kawamoto (Hitotsubashi University) states that the USSR had ‘a more democratic face than what is usually imagined, especially among Western people.’ As they put it:

The Soviet regime was democratic in its own sense of the word. [P]articipation through sending letters and attending discussions gave self-government a certain reality and helped to legitimize the Soviet regime. Therefore, listening to the people was an important obligation for the authorities. [T]he government encouraged people to send letters to the authorities and actively used the all-people’s discussions.

—Kazuko Kawamoto, [11]

It is also noted that Soviet citizens ‘believed that they were entitled to demand policy changes, and the draft writers, including specialists, officials, and deputies, felt obliged to respond to those demands.’ The process of gathering public opinion was intensive enough that it often slowed down the process of legislation:

Regarding the process of creating the Principles, direct participation worked largely as expected in the ideology of Soviet democracy, although it took many years.

—Kazuko Kawamoto, [11]

As Professor Kawamoto says, ‘the reason why it took so long was deeply rooted in the ideas of Soviet democracy.’

Collapse and dissolution[edit]

Main article: Collapse of the USSR

Gorbachev introduced new reforms to both the economy and politics, which worsened the condition of the workers by increasing wealth inequality - though it never reached the same rate as it had in capitalist countries, e.g. the U.S. - as well as breadlines, and allowed more critical opinions to be voiced politically. But heads of newspapers were now in fact being replaced or pushed towards a more right-wing view by that same government, meaning such policies did not actually result in more discourse. Nonetheless it became a more and more accepted view to advocate for regulated or even free markets, which then led to the rising popularity of Yeltsin. He criticized the Soviet elite and advocated for market reforms, promising less waiting lines and a decrease in inequality. In April 1990 Yeltsin became the chairman of the Russian parliament. The direction the country was taking triggered a coup attempt in August 1991, but which failed as Yeltsin called for a strike against it. While according to a referendum from 1991 most people did not want a complete dissolution of the Soviet republics, this is exactly what happened until the end of 1991: Parts of the government were simply dismantled, the party lost it's power, and eventually republics started declaring independence - the union, in a sense, was falling apart.

After the Soviet Union essentially simply stopped existing, living standards decreased dramatically and to this day many former citizens of it regret its fall, as many polls show, though the results sometimes strongly vary among some of the former republics.

Political Economy of the Soviet Union[edit]

Soviet workers had legitimate influence in the worksteads.[12]

Wage Labour[edit]

In capitalist theories of the Soviet Union labour-power is considered a commodity in the Soviet Union, bought and sold on a labour-market.

Commodity Production[edit]

In capitalist theories of the Soviet Union, commodity production is regarded to have had a generalised character, with inputs and outputs being commodities. Labour-power was sold to and bought by individual state enterprises, the means of production were sold between individual enterprises, and outputs, capital and consumer goods, were likewise sold to a market of consumers.

Competition of Capitals[edit]

In capitalist theories of the Soviet Union there is some debate about the existence of the competition of capitals. Tony Cliff and Raya Dunayevskaya claim that the law of value operated nonetheless due to international trade. Paresh Chattopadhyay disagrees, arguing that the law of value couldn't exist under such conditions and maintains that enterprises were reciprocally independent and were 'competitive' in the Marxist sense by confronting each other through the exchange of commodities.

Accusations of imperialism[edit]

The USSR has been accused of imperialism by Left Communists, Trotskyists, and Hoxhaists.

Non-mode of production[edit]

Some Marxists provide an alternative theory of the nature of the political economy of the Soviet Union. The theory was first formulated by Hillel Ticktin.


Main article: economics of the Soviet Union

With the exceptional periods of the 1910s and the 1990s, the Soviet Union was a planned economy. It achieved massively positive economic results until the 1970s, when revisionist policies and the Cold War began to cause a stagnation.

Prerevolutionary background[edit]

In 1917, Russia was a backwards, semicapitalist and feudal society. They had only recently abolished the manor system, and replaced it with the most brutal and primitive form of capitalism. The nation was dreadfully underdeveloped, with no sign of improving in the future, and what little growth did occur led to massive inequalities. According to a Professor of Economic History at Oxford University:

Not only were the bases of Imperial advance narrow, but the process of growth gave rise to such inequitable changes in income distribution that revolution was hardly a surprise. Real wages for urban workers were static in the late Imperial period despite a significant increase in output per worker[.] The revolution was also a peasant revolt, and the interests of the peasants were different[.] As in the cities, there was no gain in real wages.

—Robert C. Allen, [[1]]

The University of Warwick corroborates these observations:

Agriculture had reached North American levels of productivity by 1913 and wheat prices collapsed after 1914. The expansion of the railroads had run its course and there was no prospect of protected light industry becoming internationally competitive. The appropriate comparators for the prospects for Russian capitalism in the twentieth century are not Japan but Argentina or even India. Moreover, Russian capitalist development had brought little if any benefit to the urban and rural working class, intensifying the class conflicts that erupted in Revolution.

Revolutionary period[edit]

With the 1917 revolution (and after the bloody civil war, with its policy of war communism), the Soviet economy began to grow rapidly. The New Economic Policy (which nationalized large-scale industry and redistributed land, while allowing for the private sale of agricultural surplus) succeeded in transforming Russia from a semicapitalist existence into a developing state capitalist society, laying the groundwork for a planned economy.

Following War Communism, the New Economic Policy (NEP) sought to develop the Russian economy within a quasi-capitalist framework.

Economic circumstances came to require the transition to a planned economy:

However, the institutional and structural barriers to Russian economic development were now compounded by the unfavorable circumstances of the world economy, so that there was no prospect of export-led development, while low domestic incomes provided only a limited market for domestic industry. Without a state coordinated investment program, the Soviet economy would be caught in the low-income trap typical of the underdeveloped world.

In 1928 (after they selected the new head of the Communist Party), the RSFSR instituted a fully planned economy, and the first Five Year Plan was enacted. This resulted in rapid economic growth:

Soviet GDP increased rapidly with the start of the first Five Year Plan in 1928. […] The expansion of heavy industry and the use of output targets and soft-budgets to direct firms were appropriate to the conditions of the 1930s, they were adopted quickly, and they led to rapid growth of investment and consumption.

—Robert C. Allen, [[2]]

Bourgeois economists often alleged that this rapid growth came at the cost of per-capita consumption and living standards. However, more recent research has shown this to be false:

There has been no debate that ‘collective consumption’ (principally education and health services) rose sharply, but the standard view was that private consumption declined. Recent research, however, calls that conclusion into question. […] While investment certainly increased rapidly, recent research shows that the standard of living also increased briskly. […] Calories are the most basic dimension of the standard of living, and their consumption was higher in the late 1930s than in the 1920s. […] There has been no debate that ‘collective consumption’ (principally education and health services) rose sharply, but the standard view was that private consumption declined. Recent research, however, calls that conclusion into question. […] Consumption per head rose about one quarter between 1928 and the late 1930s.

—Robert C. Allen, [[3]]

Calorie consumption rose rapidly during this period:

Calories are the most basic dimension of the standard of living, and their consumption was higher in the late 1930s than in the 1920s. […] In 1895-1910, calorie availability was only 2100 per day, which is very low by modern standards. By the late 1920s, calorie availability advanced to 2500. […] By the late 1930s, the recovery of agriculture increased calorie availability to 2900 per day, a significant increase over the late 1920s. The food situation during the Second World War was severe, but by 1970 calorie consumption rose to 3400, which was on a par with western Europe.

—Robert C. Allen, [[4]]

Overall, the development of the Soviet economy during the interbellum period was extremely impressive:

The Soviet economy performed well. […] Planning led to high rates of capital accumulation, rapid GDP growth, and rising per capita consumption even in the 1930s. […] The expansion of heavy industry and the use of output targets and soft-budgets to direct firms were appropriate to the conditions of the 1930s, they were adopted quickly, and they led to rapid growth of investment and consumption.

—Robert C. Allen, [[5]]

The USSR’s growth during the interbellum period exceeded that of the market economies:

The USSR led the non-OECD countries and, indeed, achieved a growth rate in this period that exceeded the OECD catch-up regression as well as the OECD average.

—Robert C. Allen, [[6]]

This success is also attributed specifically to the revolution and the planned economy:

This success would not have occurred without the 1917 revolution or the planned development of state owned industry.

—Robert C. Allen, [[7]]

The benefits of the planned economy become obvious upon closer study:

A capitalist economy would not have created the industrial jobs required to employ the surplus labour, since capitalists would only employ labour so long as the marginal product of labour exceeded the wage. State-sponsored industrialization faced no such constraints, since enterprises were encouraged to expand employment in line with the demands of the plan.

Economic growth was also aided by the liberation of women, and the resulting control over the birth rate, as well as women's participation in the workforce:

The rapid growth in per capita income was contingent not just on the rapid expansion of GDP but also on the slow growth of the population. This was primarily due to a rapid fertility transition rather than a rise in mortality from collectivization, political repression, or the Second World War. Falling birth rates were primarily due to the education and employment of women outside the home. These policies, in turn, were the results of enlightenment ideology in its communist variant.

—Robert C. Allen, [[8]]

Reviews of Allen’s work have backed up his statements:

Allen shows that the Stalinist strategy worked, in strictly economic terms, until around 1970. […] Allen’s book convincingly establishes the superiority of a planned over a capitalist economy in conditions of labour surplus (which is the condition of most of the world most of the time).

Other studies have backed-up the findings that the USSR’s living standards rose rapidly:

Remarkably large and rapid improvements in child height, adult stature and infant mortality were recorded from approximately 1945 to 1970. […] Both Western and Soviet estimates of GNP growth in the Soviet Union indicate that GNP per capita grew in every decade in the postwar era, at times far surpassing the growth rates of the developed western economies. […] The conventional measures of GNP growth and household consumption indicate a long, uninterrupted upward climb in the Soviet standard of living from 1928 to 1985; even Western estimates of these measures support this view, albeit at a slower rate of growth than the Soviet measures.

Cold War[edit]

Unfortunately, the introduction of market reforms and other revisionist policies delayed the increase of living standards:

Three different measures of population health show a consistent and large improvement between approximately 1945 and 1969: child height, adult height and infant mortality all improved significantly during this period. These three biological measures of the standard of living also corroborate the evidence of some deterioration in living conditions beginning around 1970, when infant and adult mortality were rising and child and adult height stopped increasing and in some regions began to decline.

Economic growth also began to slow around this time:

After the Second World War, the Soviet economy resumed rapid growth. By 1970, the growth rate was sagging, and per capita output was static by 1985.

The Cold War was another factor which contributed to slowing growth rates:

The Cold War was an additional factor that lowered Soviet growth after 1968. The creation of high tech weaponry required a disproportionate allocation of R & D personnel and resources to the military. Innovation in civilian machinery and products declined accordingly. Half of the decreased in the growth rate of per capita GDP was due to the decline in productivity growth, and that decrease provides an upper bound to the impact of the arms race with the United States.

Despite the delayed growth rates, food consumption remained at acceptable levels. By 1976 the average caloric intake of the Soviet population was 3,330.[13] Similarly, a 1983 report confirmed that Soviets and U.S. citizens ate about the same amount of food quotidianly, but the Soviet diet may have be more eutrophic; they put the daily caloric intake at 3,280.[14] [15] Dr. Kenneth Gray, the White House’s top expert on Soviet agriculture, confirmed in his testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that ‘the food shortages in the USSR are occurring at fairly respectable levels of consumption.’[16]

While the USSR did become a major importer of grain by the 1980s,[16] they intended these imports strictly for feeding livestock, since it takes between seven and fourteen pounds of grain to produce one pound of meat. They thereby increased their consumption of meat and dairy.[17] Per capita meat consumption in the USSR doubled from the 1960s to the 1980s and exceeded such nations as the Kingdom of Norway, Italy, Greece, the Kingdom of Spain,[18] Japan, and the State of Israel. Milk production increased almost sixty percent in two decades, to the point when during the 1980s the USSR became by far the world’s largest milk-producing country. According to the 1982 CIA report on the Soviet economy, ‘The Soviet Union remains basically self-sufficient with respect to food.’[19] These were the accomplishments of an agrarian labour force that decreased from 42% in 1960 to 20% in 1980, working in a country where over 90% of the land is either too arid or too frigid for farming.[20]



Health conditions in Imperial Russia had been deplorable; it was among the unhealthiest nations in Europe, if not Earth in general:

Without doubt the Soviet Union was one of the most underdeveloped European countries at the time of the October Revolution. In terms of life-expectancy it lagged behind the other industrialized countries of Europe by a gap of about 15 years.

However, after the October Revolution, healthcare conditions began to improve rapidly.[21] By the end of the interbellum period, healthcare standards (measured by life expectancy and mortality rates) were superior to those of Western Europe and the USA:

One of the most striking advances of socialism has been and was generally seen to be the improvement in public health provision for the population as a whole. In accordance with this assumption mortality-rates in the Soviet Union declined rapidly in the first two decades after World War II. In 1965 life-expectancy for men and women in all parts of the Soviet Union, which still included vast underdeveloped regions with unfavorable living conditions, were as high or even higher than in the United States. Such a development fits perfectly into the picture of emerging industrial development and generally improving conditions of living.

Even reactionary intellectuals were forced to acknowledge these achievements; according to Nick Eberstadt (an antisocialist think-tank adviser), healthcare standards in the Soviet Union during the interbellum period surpassed those of the USA and Western Europe:

Over much of this century the nation in the vanguard of the revolution in health was the Soviet Union. In 1897 Imperial Russia offered its people a life expectancy of perhaps thirty years. In European Russia, from what we can make out, infant mortality (that is, death in the first year) claimed about one child in four, and in Russia’s Asian hinterlands the toll was probably closer to one in three. Yet by the late 1950s the average Soviet citizen could expect to live 68.7 years: longer than his American counterpart, who had begun the century with a seventeen-year lead. By 1960 the Soviet infant mortality rate, higher than any in Europe as late as the Twenties, was lower than that of Italy, Austria, or East Germany, and seemed sure to undercut such nations as Belgium and West Germany any year.

He even notes that these achievements made planned economics seem nearly indefatigable:

In the face of these and other equally impressive material accomplishments, Soviet claims about the superiority of their “socialist” system, its relevance to the poor countries, and the inevitability of its triumph over the capitalist order were not easily refuted.

While health conditions did start to decline after the introduction of revisionist policies in the mid-1960s, the healthcare achievements of the planned economy remain unimpeachable.


  1. Brinton, C. (1965). The Anatomy of Revolution, p. 225-226)
  2. Losurdo, Domenico. "1". Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WS8cCjXDgdJaXFrkW9b1ldY3xlwiPPQ89AwZo53Amlk. 
  3. Downey, Town; Smith, Nigel (1996). "6". Russia and the USSR 1900–1995. Great Clarendon Street: Oxford University Press. p. 43. ISBN 0-19-917248-X. https://books.google.com/books?id=vYIqpmIgYZ4C&pg=PA37. 
  4. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf
  5. https://miamioh.edu/cas/academics/departments/history/about/faculty/emeriti-faculty/thurston/index.html
  6. https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/history/staff/64/professor-james-harris
  7. Harris, James. "Historian James Harris Says Russian Archives Show We’ve Misunderstood Stalin". History News Network. https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/163498. Retrieved 2020-01-03. 
  8. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-i/the-day-that-the-usa-invaded-russia-and-fought-with-the-red-army-x.html
  9. Thurston, Robert (1986). "Fear and Belief in the USSR’s “Great Terror”: Response to Arrest, 1935-1939". Slavic Review (Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies) 45 (2): 213–34. doi:10.2307/2499175. 
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 Thurston, Robert. Reassessing the History of Soviet Workers: Opportunities to Criticize and Participate in Decision-Making, 1935–1941. https://www.docdroid.net/t9gG4jQ/thurston-robert-reassessing-the-history-of-soviet-workers-opportunities-to-criticize-and-participate-in-decision-making.pdf. 
  11. 11.0 11.1 Kawamoto, Kazuko. "Rethinking Soviet Democracy". Japanese Political Science Review. https://researchmap.jp/read0148263/?lang=english. 
  12. https://www.docdroid.net/t9gG4jQ/thurston-robert-reassessing-the-history-of-soviet-workers-opportunities-to-criticize-and-participate-in-decision-making.pdf
  13. Birman, Igor (1989-06-18). Personal Consumption in the USSR and the USA. Springer. p. 36. ISBN 978-1-349-10349-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=_hexCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA36. 
  14. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00274R000300150009-5.pdf
  15. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000498133.pdf
  16. 16.0 16.1 Medley, Joseph. "Soviet Agriculture: A Critique of the Myths Constructed by Western Critics". https://web.archive.org/web/20110611145106/http://www.usm.maine.edu/eco/joe/works/Soviet.html. Retrieved 2019-10-09. 
  17. Syzmański, Albert (1984). "5". Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books Ltd.. p. 132. ISBN 0 086232 018 6. https://archive.org/stream/HumanRightsInTheSovietUnion#page/n74/mode/1up. 
  18. Syzmański, Albert (1984). "5". Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books Ltd.. pp. 128–9. ISBN 0 086232 018 6. https://archive.org/stream/HumanRightsInTheSovietUnion#page/n72/mode/1up. 
  19. Hoffmann, Erik P.; Laird, Robbin Frederick. The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era. Transaction Publishers. p. 431. ISBN 978-1-4128-3909-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=63_obglArrMC&pg=PA431. 
  20. "Soviet farming: more success than failure?". Christian Science Monitor. 1982-12-13. ISSN 0882-7729. https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/1213/121323.html. Retrieved 2019-10-09. 
  21. Howard M. Leichter (1979). "7". A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health Care Policy in Four Nations. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 200. ISBN 0-521-22648. Archived from the original on 27/July/2018. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cfI6AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA200.